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Abstract
We examine a supply base diversiﬁcation problem faced by a buyer who periodically holds auctions
to award short term supply contracts among a cohort of suppliers (i.e., the supply base). To mitigate
signiﬁcant cost shocks to procurement, the buyer can diversify her supply base by selecting suppliers
from diﬀerent regions. We ﬁnd that the optimal degree of supply base diversiﬁcation depends
on the buyer’s bargaining power, i.e., the buyer’s ability to choose the auction mechanism. At
one extreme, when the buyer has full bargaining power and thus can dictatorially implement the
optimal mechanism, she prefers to fully diversify. At the other extreme, when the buyer uses a
reverse English auction with no reserve price due to her lack of bargaining power, she may consider
protecting herself against potential price escalation from cost-advantaged suppliers by using a less
diversiﬁed supply base. We ﬁnd that in general the more bargaining power the buyer has to control
price escalation from cost-advantaged suppliers the more she prefers a diversiﬁed supply base. This
insight is shown to be robust to correlation between regional costs, asymmetry across regions, and
intermediate levels of bargaining power.
November 20091. Introduction
It is common for buyers (procurement managers) responsible for procuring an item to identify a
supply base, a group of qualiﬁed suppliers that are capable of producing the item. A supply base is
a well-known tool for managing risks. For specialized items where availability is the main objective,
buyers can place orders with multiple suppliers to manage non-delivery risks (e.g., Anupindi and
Akella 1993). But, as is our focus in this paper, a supply base can also be a crucial strategic tool
for purchasing commodity-type items where cost, not availability, is the central issue.
Buyers typically do not know the true costs of suppliers, who possess private information about
their cost drivers (inventory level, capacity utilization, ﬁnancial status, etc.). To ﬁnd a low price,
buyers increasingly employ procurement auctions aimed at price discovery (Jap 2003). As the
practitioner survey Beall et al. (2003) page 49 points out, “If a qualiﬁed supply base is identiﬁed,
and the market for a particular commodity/purchase family group changes rapidly, [procurement
auctions] are an excellent tool to award business for short duration and re-auction regularly. For
example, one company interviewed purchases highly engineered printed circuit boards quarterly
through [procurement auctions].” In a procurement auction, competition between suppliers can
come down to cents or fractions of a cent, yet these small diﬀerences can translate into millions
of dollars of savings to the buyer given large volumes — a high tech ﬁrm we interacted with runs
quarterly auctions in which commodity (cables, connectors, etc.) suppliers compete on unit prices
in increments of one tenth of a cent.
When margins are razor-thin, factors such as transportation costs, commissions, and logistics
costs become non-negligible (Pederson 2004). Buyers are increasingly aware of the need to make
sourcing decisions based on total cost, which from the buyer’s perspective measures the total cost
of procuring from the supplier. In addition to the supplier’s price, total cost includes non-price
costs such as logistics and transportation costs, shipping insurance and commissions (Ariba 2005).
In this paper we introduce the idea of strategic supply base design to mitigate total procurement
cost shocks, and examine how the buyer’s optimal supply base design is aﬀected by the buyer’s
bargaining clout. We now motivate and introduce both these concepts.
Supply base design to mitigate cost shocks. The “non-price costs” associated with a
supplier can be closely related to the supplier’s geographic region, and thus subject to cost shocks
aﬀecting that region. For example, shipping costs associated with procuring from a supplier are
largely aﬀected by local logistics markets and regulations within the supplier’s region, and can be
1dramatically increased by labor strikes or regulation changes. In February 2007, the CN Railway
strike disabled almost three quarters of Canada’s rail capacity, forcing companies such as Ford to
look for much more expensive alternatives like truck freight for shipments from its Canadian suppli-
ers. Seeking heightened security for the Olympics in the summer of 2008, the Chinese government
forbade a wide range of hazardous materials at six major ports; aﬀected buyers incurred signiﬁcant
rerouting costs. Other examples of regional cost shocks include ocean shipping insurance rates
(which are based on geopolitical and geosecurity elements along shipping routes1).
Ideally, a buyer could respond to regional cost shocks by instantly augmenting her supply base
with new suppliers from unaﬀected regions. However, for some buyers this can be impractical (for
all but the most catastrophic scenarios), because ﬁnding and qualifying a new supplier is usually
time-consuming and costly. The process of vetting suppliers, called supplier qualiﬁcation screening
(Wan and Beil 2009), typically involves reference checks, ﬁnancial audits, site visits to supplier
facilities abroad, approval and buy-in from the buyers’ internal customers, etc. At a Fortune 100
manufacturer we interacted with it takes an average of 8 to 26 weeks to ﬁnd and qualify a new
supplier — even for commodity parts.
Instead of frequently ﬁnding and qualifying totally new suppliers, buyers, including the large
manufacturer we interacted with, build their supply base as a long-term strategic decision, and then
frequently auction oﬀ short-term supply contracts among them to ﬁnd the current lowest-total-cost
supplier. For such buyers, therefore, an important strategic decision arises when forming their
supply base: Facing potential regional cost shocks, should the buyer’s supply base include similar
suppliers (selected from the same region) or diversiﬁed suppliers (selected from diﬀerent regions)?
Intuitively, geographically diversifying the supply base, i.e., selecting suppliers from diﬀerent
regions, can mitigate regional cost shocks. For example, once a prolonged labor strike at the ports
in region A drives up the cost of transporting goods from the supplier in region A, a buyer who
sources a large and expensive-to-transport component can avoid a high transportation cost if she
has a supplier in an unaﬀected region B. However, a buyer seeking to minimize total procurement
cost needs to take into account the impact of diversifying on her contract payment: Will the supplier
in region B strategically mark up his price to make a windfall proﬁt based on his cost advantage
over the supplier in region A? If so, how should the buyer design her supply base in the ﬁrst place
to manage both regional-costs risks and supplier-windfall-proﬁt-taking risks?
1A recent example is the thousand-percent increase in shipping insurance premiums for Asia to Europe ocean
transport, as freighters funneling through the Suez canal face a gauntlet of pirates and kidnappers based in an
increasingly destabilized Somalia (Costello 2008).
2Bargaining power and supply base design decision. In our study the buyer’s contract
payment is determined through a competitive bidding process (i.e., auction). Thus, it is crucial
to understand how the buyer’s ability to design auctions (i.e., choose auction format and rules)
should be taken into account when she designs her supply base. We term such ability the buyer’s
bargaining power. For forward auctions, Bulow and Klemperer (1996) point out that an auctioneer
with no bargaining power can only run an English auction with no reserve price while an auctioneer
with full bargaining power can utilize an optimal auction mechanism.
Similarly, in this paper, at one extreme we model a buyer with no bargaining power — such a
buyer cannot make credible take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers and must solely rely on supplier competition
for price concessions, utilizing a simple reverse English auction with no reserve price. In such an
auction, the lowest-total-cost supplier charges the buyer a price that is set according to second-
lowest supplier’s total-cost, creating the risk of severe windfall-proﬁt taking. Returning to our
example two paragraphs above, the supplier in region B could take windfall proﬁts and consequently
the buyer’s total cost could be the total cost of the supplier in region A, which includes A’s regional
cost shock! Thus, the imperative to diversify the supply base (i.e., choose suppliers from diﬀerent
regions) is mitigated by the need for cost parity among suppliers. We ﬁnd that the optimal amount
of diversiﬁcation depends on the total number of suppliers and the likelihood of regional cost shocks.
At the other extreme, we model a buyer having full bargaining power, who thus can design
an optimal procurement mechanism within which suppliers compete for the buyer’s business (e.g.,
could promise to bias against the supplier in B who has regional cost advantage). Between the two
extremes there can be intermediate cases, where for example the buyer is unable to use an optimal
mechanism but can commit to using a reserve price in a reverse English auction. We ﬁnd that
supplier cost parity is less crucial for buyers with more bargaining power — such buyers are better
served by a diversiﬁed supply base — and the optimal supply-base-design strategy can depend on
the distributions of supplier costs and regional cost shocks.
The next section reviews related literature, and §3 introduces the model and assumptions.
Section 4 analyzes the buyer’s optimal supply-base-design problem and compares two cases: one in
which the buyer has full bargaining power and uses the optimal mechanism, and the other in which
the buyer has no bargaining power and uses a reverse English auction without a reserve price. In
§5.1–5.3 we analyze, respectively, cases where regional costs are codependent, regions are ex ante
asymmetric, and a buyer with intermediate bargaining power uses a reserve price in conjunction
3with a reverse English auction. We provide numerical illustrations of our results in §6 and conclude
in §7. All proofs are provided in the electronic companion.
2. Literature Review
Our paper analytically studies how buyers should select suppliers to mitigate regional cost risks,
and is thus related to the supply risk management literature. However, our paper diﬀers from
the majority of the literature in two main aspects. First, we focus on supply risks that can be
modeled as “cost shocks,” while the existing literature mainly focuses on catastrophic “supply
shocks” that cause supply shortages. Such “supply shocks,” more commonly referred to as supply
disruptions, include natural disasters (ﬁre, hurricane, earthquake, etc.), supplier bankruptcy, etc.
Researchers have studied various mitigation and contingency strategies to manage supply disruption
risks; readers are referred to Tomlin (2006), which categorizes these strategies as stockpiling, multi-
sourcing, using backup options, managing demand, and others. Among these categories, multi-
sourcing and using backup options are related to supply base design. Studies on multi-sourcing
to mitigate supply disruptions typically focus on buyers’ inventory management decisions (e.g.,
determining the optimal ordering quantity and split of quantities among suppliers) and model the
impact of disruptions by various random yield models. Recent examples include Dada et al. (2007),
Federgruen and Yang (2007, 2008), etc.; readers are referred to Tomlin (2006), which provides a
detailed survey of early work of this stream. For work including backup options in the supply base,
see, for example, Yang et al. (2009) and references therein.
Second, this paper studies price escalation risks (e.g., windfall-proﬁt taking by suppliers), while
the majority of supply risk management literature presumes exogenous contract prices (or unit
procurement costs) and ignores suppliers’ strategic pricing behavior. One exception is Babich et
al. (2007), which endogenizes suppliers’ pricing decisions in a multi-sourcing problem where a
buyer allocates ordering quantities among suppliers with correlated default risks. They assume
that suppliers have full information of competitors’ costs, and show how suppliers’ pricing decisions
can be aﬀected by their default risk correlations. In particular, they ﬁnd that the buyer prefers
suppliers with positively correlated default risks despite the loss of diversiﬁcation beneﬁts, because
default risk correlation increases supplier competition. In our paper, which studies the supply base
design problem in the presence of suppliers’ regional cost risks, we model supplier competition
via procurement auctions in which suppliers possess private cost information, and we show how
supplier competition can be aﬀected by correlations across suppliers’ cost shocks. We ﬁnd that
4the buyer’s bargaining power dictates her preference for the supply base design, namely, a buyer
with stronger bargaining power prefers a more diversiﬁed supply base, which eﬀects less correlation
across suppliers’ cost shocks.
The term “bargaining power” is probably one of the most widely used but vaguely deﬁned
concepts in the literature of bargaining models. In the literature of bargaining games with com-
plete information, the asymmetric Nash bargaining model (Roth 1979) “captures some imprecisely
deﬁned ‘bargaining power’ ” (Binmore et al. 1986) by including weighting scalars in the calcula-
tion of utility products. However, the literature on bargaining games with incomplete information
focuses on analyzing bargaining outcomes given diﬀerent bargaining mechanisms (see Ausubel et
al. (2002) for a detailed survey), without explicitly deﬁning players’ “bargaining power.” In the
present paper, we interpret the term “bargaining power” as the buyer’s ability to impose an auction
mechanism that she favors, an interpretation that can be traced to the prominent work of Bulow
and Klemeperer (1996). In other words, we use the term “bargaining power” as a way to rank the
auction mechanisms that we study in this paper.
Extensive work has examined procurement cost reduction via supply base competition. El-
maghraby (2007) surveys industry practices in designing and running auctions for e-sourcing events,
while Elmaghraby (2000) provides a comprehensive survey of operations research and economics
work on competitive sourcing strategies, including auctions. Grey et al. (2005) discuss the role
of e-marketplaces within long-term buyer-supplier relationships. Our paper considers a buyer who
ﬁnds the lowest-price provider by periodically auctioning oﬀ short-term supply contracts among
a stable supply base. Recent work on the use of auctions in supply chains include Chen (2007),
which studies a buyer auctioning supply contracts, and Chen and Vulcano (2008), which studies a
supplier’s auction to sell capacity and compares ﬁrst- and second-price auction formats. We study
various auction formats, but focus on understanding how they aﬀect the buyer’s supply base design
decision. Methodologically, our paper is related to the auction and mechanism design literature;
readers are referred to the books by Krishna (2002) and Milgrom (2004), which provide excellent
treatments and detailed references on auction theory.
3. Model and Preliminaries
3.1 Model setup
We study a stylized model in which a risk-neutral buyer (e.g., an OEM) selects a cohort of N
qualiﬁed suppliers to form a supply base for a needed input component. We allow N to be any
5integer greater than or equal to two. In period t = 0, the buyer designs the supply base. For sim-
plicity, we assume that designing the supply base amounts to a one-time decision and no suppliers
are removed from or added to the supply base after it is established. This models settings where
frequently ﬁnding and qualifying new suppliers is impractical due to costly and time-consuming
supplier qualiﬁcation screening processes.
To focus on the supply base diversiﬁcation decision, we assume that N is exogenously given.
Suppliers can be selected from diﬀerent geographic regions. The buyer’s decision variables are the
number of regions to select suppliers from, R, and the number of suppliers to select from each region,
denoted by n1,n2,...,nR for region 1, region 2 ..., and region R, respectively, where
 R
r=1 nr = N.
We assume that there are at least N ex ante symmetric regions available and within each region
up to N suppliers can be found. (We extend our results to ex ante asymmetric regions in §5.2. The
analysis also changes in a straightforward way if a limited number of regions are available; see our
discussion in §7.) Thus, the number of regions R can be any integer from 1 to N; in particular,
R = 1 means selecting all suppliers from only one region, which we call the pooling strategy, and
R = N means selecting each supplier from a diﬀerent region, which we call the fully diversifying
strategy.
After establishing her supply base (ﬁnding and pre-qualifying the suppliers) in period zero, in
each of the following periods (indexed by t ≥ 1) the buyer runs an auction to award an indivisible
short-term contract to one of the suppliers in the supply base. This setup is most appropriate when
the buyer procures commodity parts from suppliers, who do not fully rely on the buyer’s contract
to keep aﬂoat. To keep the analysis focused and tractable, we assume that the buyer does not
store inventory and does not have in-house production, hence she must contract with one supplier
in every period. This setup could model, for example, a buyer who produces high tech, short life-
cycle products, relies on suppliers for key components, and holds quarterly supply auctions. When
analyzing auction outcomes we assume that the suppliers are risk-neutral and fully rational players
following a Bayesian Nash bidding equilibrium, as is standard in the auction literature.
Two types of costs are associated with each supplier i = 1,...,N in each period t. The ﬁrst
type of cost is an idiosyncratic production cost, xt
i ∈ [0,1], which as typical in auction models is
assumed to be independently and identically distributed across suppliers and periods according to a
commonly known distribution F. Cost xt
i represents supplier i’s ﬁrm-speciﬁc and privately-known
cost of fulﬁlling the contract oﬀered in period t, per supplier i’s inventory level, capacity utilization,
working capital position, debt status, etc. For simplicity we assume F has a positive and continuous
density f and is stationary over time (this assumption can also be relaxed; see our discussion in
6§7). As is standard in the auction theoretic literature, we also assume that x +
F(x)
f(x) is increasing
in x. This technical assumption ensures a pure-strategy implementation of the optimal mechanism
(described in §3.2), and is satisﬁed, for example, by all logconcave f, including uniform, normal,
logistic, and exponential distributions (Bagnoli and Bergstrom 2005).
The second type of cost is a region-speciﬁc cost, yt
r, which represents (from the buyer’s per-
spective) common costs aﬀecting all suppliers in region r in period t. We let at
i denote the regional
cost of supplier i in period t, that is, at
i = yt
r if supplier i is located in region r. In our analysis,
we assume such regional costs are not related to suppliers’ production costs but are the additional,
additive procurement expenses the buyer incurs when doing business with a supplier in the region,
for instance, transportation and logistics costs. (Our results easily extend to cases where regional
factors also inﬂuence suppliers’ production costs; see our discussion in §7.) We assume that, at the
outset of each period t, the buyer can observe all regional costs, and each supplier i can observe
his own regional cost at
i but may or may not observe other suppliers’ regional costs. We assume
that yt
r’s are independently and identically distributed across regions and periods according to a
commonly known distribution G with ﬁnite mean (i.e., E[yt
r] < ∞). In §5.1, we discuss how our
results extend when regional costs are possibly codependent, and in §5.2 study cases where regions
can be asymmetric in terms of their regional and production cost distributions. For simplicity we
assume G is stationary over time, although this too can be relaxed (see §7).



































s.t. R ∈ {1,...,N}, ni ∈ N ∀i ∈ {1,...,R}, and n1 + ... + nR = N,
where β is a discount factor and πMech(xt,at) is the buyer’s period-t total procurement cost given
the auction mechanism Mech. Since xt
i’s and at
i’s are assumed to be identically distributed from
period to period, the buyer’s objective is simpliﬁed to minimizing the expected one-period total
procurement cost. Therefore, we omit the superscript t for notational convenience in the rest of
this paper. In §4, we focus on two auction mechanisms — the optimal mechanism (denoted by
Mech = OPT) and the reverse English auction without reserve price (denoted by Mech = RE),
7representing the cases in which the buyer has full bargaining power and zero bargaining power,
respectively (Bulow and Klemperer 1996). In §5.3, we study the case in which the buyer has
intermediate bargaining power and can impose a reserve price in a reverse English auction (denoted
by Mech = RER). We describe these three auction mechanisms in §3.2.
The buyer’s supply base design strategy aﬀects her expected total procurement cost because
diﬀerent strategies yield diﬀerent at given a realized yt. For example, in a four-supplier case
(N = 4), if the buyer selects all four suppliers from region 1, (i.e., pooling), the suppliers’ regional
costs are a = (y1,y1,y1,y1), while if the buyer selects two suppliers from regions 1 and 2 each, the
suppliers’ regional costs are a = (y1,y1,y2,y2). The pooling strategy enables the buyer to “win
big” (i.e., secure a low regional cost no matter which supplier wins the contract) if region 1 happens
to have a low regional cost, but it is clearly a very risky strategy — the buyer would “lose big”
(i.e., suﬀer a high regional cost no matter which supplier wins the contract) if a large cost shock
hits region 1. In contrast, a diversiﬁcation strategy — say, the two-region strategy — engenders
regional cost disparities among suppliers and hence increases the likelihood for the buyer to access at
least some suppliers from low-cost regions. But is this more temperate, diversiﬁed approach better
than potentially winning big with a pooling strategy? As yet the buyer’s preference for or against
diversiﬁcation is unclear, mainly because the buyer’s contract price is determined through supplier
competition (an auction), which would obviously be aﬀected by the cost disparities introduced by
diversiﬁcation strategies. Thus, one might imagine that the buyer’s optimal supply base design
strategy will depend on the number of suppliers N, the cost distributions F and G, and the auction
mechanism. In this paper, we characterize the buyer’s optimal supply base design strategy and
describe when and if her optimal strategy depends on her ability to choose an auction mechanism
(i.e., her bargaining power). To this end, we next formally describe the auction mechanisms we
will examine.
3.2 Auction mechanisms
Optimal mechanism (OPT). When the buyer has full bargaining power, she can oﬀer suppliers
a join-or-leave-it mechanism such that all suppliers will participate and the buyer’s expected total





f(xi), which is commonly referred to as supplier i’s virtual cost in the mechanism
design literature, and let ψ(xi) + ai denote supplier i’s adjusted virtual cost, that is, supplier i’s
virtual cost adjusted by the additive regional cost ai. In equilibrium, the optimal mechanism awards
the contract to supplier j having the lowest adjusted virtual cost, i.e., j = argmin
i=1...N
{ψ(xi) + ai},
8breaking ties evenly, and pays the contract winner min{ψ−1[ψ(xj1) + aj1 − aj],1}, where j1 =
argmin
i=1...N, i =j
{ψ(xi) + ai} is the losing supplier with the lowest adjusted virtual cost. The payment
is truncated from above by an optimal reserve price of 1. Because the buyer must contract with
a supplier, if the buyer uses a reserve price, it is always optimal to set it at the worst possible
supplier cost type, i.e., at 1. The optimality of these award and payment rules can be proved by
straightforward adaptation of Myerson (1981).2 To implement this optimal mechanism, we now
propose a modiﬁed reverse clock auction, in which bidding proceeds as follows. The auction begins
at calling price ψ(1) + max
i=1...N
{ai}, and continuously drops. Each bidder signals their willingness
to stay in the auction or drop out, and the auction ends when at most one bidder remains in the
auction. Let p be the calling price when the auction ends. The last bidder remaining in the auction,
say bidder j, wins and is paid min{ψ−1(p − aj),1}; ties are broken randomly.
Proposition 1 The optimal mechanism can be implemented by the modiﬁed reverse clock auction
described above. Furthermore, in such an auction, bidders have a dominant strategy of staying in
the auction until the calling price reaches their true adjusted virtual cost.
Reverse English auction without/with reserve (RE/RER). In the case where the buyer does
not have any bargaining power, she can only demand price concessions on the basis of competing
oﬀers from suppliers and cannot credibly impose a reserve price. Thus, the contract award and
payment decisions can be modeled as outcomes of a reverse English total-cost auction without
a reserve price (RE). The auction begins with a high initial total-cost bid (again referred to as
the “calling price”) which drops continuously. Each bidder signals their willingness to stay in the
auction or drop out, and the auction ends when at most one bidder remains in the auction. Let p
be the calling price when the auction ends. The last bidder remaining in the auction, say bidder j,
wins and is paid the calling price at which the auction ended minus his regional cost, i.e., p−aj; ties
are broken randomly. In such an auction, it is a weakly dominant strategy for a supplier to stay in
the auction until the calling price reaches his true total cost xi + ai before dropping out (although
he may not have to); see, for example, Maskin and Riley (2000). Thus, the auction ends when
the second-lowest total-cost supplier drops out of the auction, and the lowest total-cost supplier is
2Myerson (1981) assumes the principal (i.e., the buyer in our case) does not possess non-public information. In
our case, however, the buyer can possess non-public information about the regional costs when the suppliers cannot
observe their competitors’ regional costs. However, following the approach of Mylovanov and Tr¨ oger (2008), one can
show that in our case the buyer ﬁnds it optimal to truthfully announce all regional costs and then implement the
mechanism as if the costs were publicly known. The intuition is that regional costs only aﬀect suppliers’ payoﬀs
indirectly (through the buyer’s allocation and payment rules).
9the winner and winds up being paid the diﬀerence between his regional cost and the second-lowest
total cost. We also study cases where the buyer has some bargaining power and can impose the
optimal reserve price of 1 in a reverse English auction (RER); the auction proceeds as before, but
the winner’s payment is capped at 1, i.e. min{p − aj,1}. In such a case, it remains optimal for
bidders to bid down to their true total costs before dropping out.
Under the three mechanisms, the buyer’s expected total procurement cost can be written as





































{xi + ai,1 + ai}
 
, (1c)
where “second min{ }” denotes the second-lowest value in the set. Throughout the paper, Xk:N and
Yk:N denote the kth-lowest order statistic out of N independent random draws from distributions
F and G, respectively, and Xk:N and Y k:N denote their respective expectations; I{A} denotes the
indicator function of event A; and ∨ and ∧ denote the componentwise maximum and minimum
operators, respectively.
4. Analysis and Results
To evaluate the buyer’s expected total procurement cost under diﬀerent diversiﬁcation strategies, we
need to compute expected order statistics of asymmetrically distributed random variables as shown
by equations (1a)–(1c). However, this is generally intractable because closed-form expressions
for expected order statistics are generally restricted to identically and independently distributed
random variables following a handful of distributions (such as power-function or exponential dis-
tributions). Our problem is even more challenging because the expected total procurement cost (i)
takes an ex ante expectation over x given a realized a, involving order statistics of random vari-
ables from asymmetric distributions; then (ii) takes an ex ante expectation over a, which involves
elements that can exhibit various correlations depending on the supply base design strategy.
Thus, to have a hope of tackling the challenging problem of optimal supply base design, we
need to exploit the problem’s structure. We accomplish this by undertaking an iterative analysis
of the buyer’s diversiﬁcation tradeoﬀ, introduced next.
104.1 Diversiﬁcation tradeoﬀ
Suppose the buyer compares an R-region diversiﬁcation strategy (ˆ n1, ˆ n2,..., ˆ nR) with the (R+1)-
region strategy (ˆ n1, ˆ n2,..., ˆ nR−1, ˜ nR, ˜ nR+1) such that ˆ nR = ˜ nR + ˜ nR+1. Let ˆ a be the vector of
suppliers’ regional costs under the R-region strategy and let ˜ a denote the vector of suppliers’
regional costs under the (R + 1)-region strategy. Given that all suppliers have independent and
identical production cost distributions, the diﬀerence between the two strategies comes entirely
from the suppliers’ regional costs ˆ a and ˜ a. We use a sample-path analysis as follows. On a sample
path with given regional costs y, the suppliers’ regional costs ˆ a and ˜ a can only diﬀer from each
other in the last ˜ nR+1 elements. In particular, when region R experiences a larger cost shock
than region (R + 1) does, i.e., yR > yR+1, switching to the (R + 1)-region strategy would have
saved the buyer money, resulting in a diversifying upside. Conversely, when region R experiences
a smaller cost shock than region (R + 1) does, i.e., yR < yR+1, switching to the (R + 1)-region
strategy would have resulted in a disbeneﬁt for the buyer, the diversifying downside. To facilitate
expressing suppliers’ regional costs under these two strategies, we let
ahh def
= (a1,...,aN−nR, yR ∨ yR+1,...,yR ∨ yR+1       
˜ nR elements




= (a1,...,aN−nR, yR ∨ yR+1,...,yR ∨ yR+1       
˜ nR elements




= (a1,...,aN−nR, yR ∧ yR+1,...,yR ∧ yR+1       
˜ nR elements




= (a1,...,aN−nR, yR ∧ yR+1,...,yR ∧ yR+1       
˜ nR elements
, yR ∧ yR+1,...,yR ∧ yR+1       
˜ nR+1 elements
).
In other words, ahh denotes the vector ˆ a when yR ≥ yR+1, ahl denotes the vector ˜ a when yR ≥
yR+1, all denotes the vector ˆ a when yR < yR+1, and alh denotes the vector ˜ a when yR < yR+1.

























11By symmetry between yR and yR+1, we have


















Deﬁnition 1 In comparing the R-region strategy with the (R+1)-region strategy, given the auction
mechanism Mech and the realized costs (x,y), we call
πMech(x,ahh) − πMech(x,ahl) − πMech(x,alh) + πMech(x,all)
the diversiﬁcation tradeoﬀ of a buyer considering switching from the R-region strategy to the (R+1)-
region strategy.
Clearly, the buyer prefers the (R + 1)-region strategy if the expected diversiﬁcation tradeoﬀ is
positive; otherwise she prefers the R-region strategy. In general, however, the buyer’s preference
is not trivial because the diversiﬁcation tradeoﬀ on a sample path can be positive or negative,
depending on (x,y), and hence the buyer’s preference between a more and a less diversiﬁed supply
base depends on the supplier production cost distribution F, the regional cost distribution G, and
the auction mechanism.
However, noticing that ahh = ahl∨alh and all = ahl∧alh, we can prove that the diversiﬁcation
tradeoﬀ is always (i.e., regardless of the realized costs x or y) non-positive/non-negative when the
buyer’s per-period cost function πMech(x,a) is submodular/supermodular in a for all x, per the
deﬁnitions of submodular and supermodular functions (see, e.g., p.43 of Topkis 1998). Formally,
we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If πMech(x,a) is supermodular in a for all x, then the buyer always prefers the (R+1)-
region strategy to the R-region strategy, which in turn implies that the fully diversifying strategy is
optimal. If πMech(x,a) is submodular in a for all x, the converse is true, which in turn implies
that the pooling strategy is optimal.
In other words, Lemma 1 provides a tractable shortcut to the buyer’s optimal supply base design
problem: Instead of comparing diversiﬁcation strategies after computing the buyer’s expected total
procurement cost under each possible supply base design strategy — which in general is technically
intractable as we mentioned — we can potentially ﬁnd the optimal strategy by examining the
super- or submodularity of the per-period total cost function πMech( ). Using this approach, we
will explore the optimal supply base design strategy and the eﬀect of the buyer’s bargaining power.
124.2 Optimal supply base design strategy for a buyer with full bargaining power
Per (1a), we have πOPT(x,a) = min
i=1,...,N
{ψ(xi)+ai}, which implies that, for any vector of suppliers’
production cost x, and any two vectors of suppliers’ regional costs a and a′, it must be true that
πOPT(x,a ∧ a′) = πOPT(x,a) ∧ πOPT(x,a′) and πOPT(x,a ∨ a′) ≥ πOPT(x,a) ∨ πOPT(x,a′).
This in turn implies that πOPT(x,a) is supermodular in a for any x. Therefore, from Lemma 1, we
obtain the optimal supply base design strategy under mechanism OPT, as stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 For any F, G, or N, it is always optimal to fully diversify if mechanism OPT is
used.
Proposition 2 highlights a remarkably general result: Whenever the buyer has the power to use
the optimal mechanism, it is optimal to fully diversify the supply base, regardless of the number
of suppliers N, or the cost distributions F and G. This is because, although the buyer’s expected
total procurement cost under any supply base design strategy in general depends on N, F, and G,
the diversiﬁcation tradeoﬀ (per Deﬁnition 1) for a buyer using OPT is non-negative for all x, y,
and R < N.
To provide intuition for Proposition 2, we will use an example to illustrate why mechanism
OPT allows the buyer to enjoy the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation, and how OPT functions. Later, we
will use this example as a point of contrast to what happens when the buyer has zero bargaining
power and uses mechanism RE. For simplicity, our example will assume that regional costs follow a
two-point distribution, and are either high, yH, or low, yL, where yH > yL. The optimal mechanism
involves the virtual cost function ψ( ), and for convenience we assume suppliers’ production costs
are uniformly distributed, making the virtual cost function linear (namely, ψ(x) = 2x).
With this setup, we examine a two-supplier case for which the pooling strategy has two suppli-
ers in region 1 and the diversifying strategy has suppliers 1 and 2 in regions 1 and 2, respectively.
Figure 1(a) pictorially illustrates the diversiﬁcation upside and diversiﬁcation downside for a par-
ticular pair of supplier production cost realizations x1 and x2. Because the function of a reserve
price is straightforward, the ﬁgure depicts cost realizations for which a supplier with a regional cost
advantage will win and receive a payment set by his competitor’s dropout bid rather than via the
reserve price.3 In this discussion we assume OPT is implemented with the auction format described
in Proposition 1.




• The top panel of Figure 1(a) depicts the diversiﬁcation upside, which occurs when (y1,y2) =
(yH,yL). Had the pooling strategy been used, both suppliers would have the high regional
cost, supplier 1 would drop out when the calling price reached his true adjusted virtual cost
ψ(x1) + yH and supplier 2 would win the auction and be paid ψ−1(ψ(x1) + yH − yH) = x1,
yielding a total procurement cost x1 + yH to the buyer. In contrast, had the diversifying
strategy been used, the buyer’s supply base would have one supplier (supplier 2) with the low
regional cost. In such a case, mechanism OPT would capture the cost reduction opportunity
by awarding the contract to supplier 2 (so the buyer incurs a low regional cost) and paying
him ψ−1(ψ(x1) + yH − yL) = x1 +
yH−yL
2 . Consequently, the buyer pockets a diversiﬁcation
upside equal to (x1 + yH) − [(x1 +
yH−yL
2 ) + yL] =
yH−yL
2 .
• The lower panel of Figure 1(a) depicts the diversiﬁcation downside, which occurs when
(y1,y2) = (yL,yH). Had the pooling strategy been used, both suppliers would have low
regional costs, and supplier 2 would win the auction and be paid ψ−1(ψ(x1)+yL −yL) = x1,
yielding a total procurement cost of x1 + yL to the buyer. However, had the diversify-
ing strategy been used, supplier 1 would be the only supplier with a low regional cost.
Mechanism OPT would award the contract to the low-regional-cost supplier 1 and pay him
ψ−1(ψ(x2)+yH−yL) = x2+
yH−yL
2 . Thus the diversiﬁcation downside equals [(x2+
yH−yL
2 )+
yL] − (x1 + yL) =
yH−yL
2 − (x1 − x2).
Note that in this example, the diversiﬁcation upside exceeds the diversiﬁcation downside. Because
symmetry implies that the upside and downside occur with equal probability, this example conﬁrms
that for these realizations of x1 and x2 the buyer always beneﬁts from diversifying.
While this example applied to a particular set of assumptions on F, G, N, and realizations of
x1 and x2, the important takeaway is that mechanism OPT helps the buyer capture surplus from
a supplier enjoying a regional cost advantage because OPT’s rules bias against such a supplier.
For example, consider the outcome for the upper-right part of Figure 1(a): Supplier 2 is paid
x1+
yH−yL
2 , which is actually
yH−yL
2 dollars less than the lowest total cost the buyer could possibly
incur if she transacted with supplier 1. The buyer gets away with this by promising ex ante
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Figure 1: The diversiﬁcation upside and downside. Panel (a) plots for mechanism OPT with N = 2
suppliers, assuming F ∼ U[0,1]; Panel (b) plots for mechanism RE with N = 2 suppliers.
payment. This biases against the advantaged supplier. In particular, when supplier 2 enjoys a
regional cost advantage, he only wins the auction if
x2 ∈ {x2|ψ(x2) + yL ≤ ψ(x1) + yH} ⊂ {x2|x2 + yL ≤ x1 + yH}. (2)
In summary, mechanism OPT biases against advantaged suppliers in order to reduce their payment,
and in doing so might impose an ineﬃcient allocation (evidenced by the proper subset relation in
(2); see also MacAfee and McMillan 1989, Rezende 2009). The upshot is that, because diversifying
engenders cost realizations in which suppliers can enjoy a regional cost advantage and mechanism
OPT allows the buyer to capitalize on the resulting cost-saving opportunities, the buyer ﬁnds it
optimal to fully diversify her supply base.
Despite being theoretically optimal, mechanism OPT may be diﬃcult to implement in practice.
First, it requires the buyer to impose rather complex take-it-or-leave-it allocation and payment rules
that bias against suppliers with a cost advantage. The buyer may have a diﬃcult time convincing
suppliers to go along with such a scheme, who might not understand why they should be put at
a disadvantage even though they have a low regional cost that is attractive for the buyer. In such
a case, the optimal mechanism may be oﬀ the table and the buyer might have to employ another
mechanism which does not require her to exert bargaining power over the suppliers. This motivates
our analysis using mechanism RE in the next subsection.
154.3 Optimal supply base design strategy for a buyer with zero bargaining power
We now examine the setting where the buyer uses a reverse English auction with no reserve price
(zero bargaining power). We ﬁrst study the case in which the buyer designs a supply base with two
suppliers, and then examine the case in which the supply base consists of N ≥ 3 suppliers.
4.3.1 Two suppliers
Per (1b), we have πRE(x,a) = max{x1 + a1,x2 + a2} when N = 2, which implies that, for any
vector of suppliers’ production costs x, and any two vectors of suppliers’ regional costs a and a′,
it must be true that
πRE(x,a ∨ a′) = πRE(x,a) ∨ πRE(x,a′) and πRE(x,a ∧ a′) ≤ πRE(x,a) ∧ πRE(x,a′).
This in turn implies that πRE(x,a) is submodular in a for all x. Therefore, from Lemma 1, we
obtain the optimal supply base design strategy under mechanism RE when N = 2:
Proposition 3 With two suppliers, for any F or G, it is always optimal to pool if mechanism RE
is used.
Surprisingly, with two suppliers, Proposition 3 shows that, rather than diversifying the supply
base, the buyer prefers to select the two suppliers from the same region if she has no bargaining
power (i.e., uses reverse English auctions without reserve price). Perhaps more surprising, this
preference persists for any supplier cost distribution and any regional cost distribution. Why
is it never optimal to spread out the regional cost risk by diversiﬁcation when the buyer uses
mechanism RE, even if large supply shocks are very likely? This is because without a reserve
price mechanism RE fully exposes the buyer to windfall proﬁt-taking by the advantaged supplier
with lower regional cost, who largely absorbs what would have been the buyer’s upside beneﬁt of
diversifying. Such windfall proﬁt-taking by the advantaged supplier is so severe that the buyer
always has no diversiﬁcation upside. We illustrate this with an example. As a point of contrast
to mechanism OPT, we use the same setup as for Example 1, but apply mechanism RE instead of
mechanism OPT. The diversiﬁcation upside and downside are illustrated in Figure 1(b)’s top and
bottom panels, respectively. 4
Example 2:
4Figure 1(b) assumes x1 > x2 and x1 + yL < x2 + yH.
16• The top panel of Figure 1(b) illustrates the diversiﬁcation upside, which occurs when (y1,y2) =
(yH,yL). Had the pooling strategy been used, both suppliers would have high regional cost,
and the lowest total-cost supplier (supplier 2) would win the auction and be paid supplier
1’s total cost minus supplier 2’s regional cost, i.e., x1 + yH − yH = x1. Thus, the buyer’s
total procurement cost would be the largest total cost, i.e., x1 + yH. In contrast, had the
diversifying strategy been used, supplier 2 would have low regional cost. However, this does
not mean the buyer will get any beneﬁt from having such a low-regional-cost supplier. On the
contrary, supplier 2, with lower total cost, would win the auction but charge price x1+yH−yL,
matching supplier 1’s total cost and yielding a total procurement cost x1 + yH to the buyer.
In other words, mechanism RE would allow the advantaged supplier 2 to fully absorb the
diversiﬁcation beneﬁt, leaving zero diversiﬁcation upside to the buyer.
• The lower panel of Figure 1(b) illustrates the diversiﬁcation downside, which occurs when
(y1,y2) = (yL,yH). Had the pooling strategy been used, both suppliers would have low
regional costs, and supplier 2, with lower total cost, would win the auction and be paid
supplier 1’s total cost minus supplier 2’s regional cost, i.e., x1 + yL − yL = x1. Thus, the
buyer’s total procurement cost would be the largest total cost, i.e., x1 + yL. In contrast, had
the diversifying strategy been used, only supplier 1 would have low regional cost. Supplier
1 would charge price x2 + yH − yL, matching supplier 2’s total cost and yielding a total
procurement cost of x2 + yH to the buyer. In other words, mechanism RE would allow the
advantaged supplier 1 to fully absorb the beneﬁt of its regional cost advantage, saddling the
buyer with a large diversiﬁcation downside.
In this example, mechanism RE allowed the supplier with lower regional cost to take so much
windfall proﬁt that diversifying yielded no diversiﬁcation beneﬁt but exposed the buyer to the
diversiﬁcation downside. That is, diversifying caused a “heads you win, tails I lose” scenario for
the buyer. The key takeaway is that severe windfall proﬁt-taking makes the buyer worse oﬀ by
diversifying, and consequently she is better oﬀ pooling her two suppliers in the same region.
As Propositions 2-3 reveal, the optimal supply base designs under OPT and RE are polar
opposites. This encapsulates our fundamental message in this paper: Bargaining power is a key
driver of supply base diversiﬁcation decisions. The buyer’s bargaining power (i.e., the auction
mechanism she is able to deploy) determines how much diversiﬁcation beneﬁt she can pocket,
which then informs her decision to diversify the supply base or not. A weak buyer who foresees
not being able to pocket the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation should take this into account and design her
17supply base with less diversiﬁcation than she would if she held full bargaining power over suppliers.
This key ﬁnding is conﬁrmed in our following analysis of the case in which the buyer uses mechanism
RE with N ≥ 3 suppliers.
4.3.2 More than two suppliers
The goal of this subsubsection is to show that a buyer with zero bargaining power (RE) and three or
more suppliers ﬁnds that, in many cases, it is suboptimal to fully diversify. This is in stark contrast
to the strategy of always fully diversifying, which is optimal for a buyer with full bargaining power
(OPT). Thus, this subsubsection reinforces the main message of the paper: The buyer’s bargaining
power can drastically aﬀect her optimal supply base design.
With three or more suppliers, the optimal diversiﬁcation strategy under mechanism RE turns
out to be much more complicated than that with two suppliers, for two reasons. First, as discussed
earlier, the buyer’s total procurement cost πRE(x,a) is the second-lowest order statistic of the
possibly correlated total costs of N suppliers. Second, this total procurement cost can easily be
shown to be neither submodular nor supermodular in a for all x — hence, the buyer’s preference
between the R-region strategy and the (R + 1)-region strategy in general depends on N, R, and
the cost distributions F and G.
To gain insight into the buyer’s supply base design preference, we will characterize how the
buyer’s preference is aﬀected by the shape and scale of the regional cost distribution G, given N
and supplier production cost distribution F. For any distribution G, we accomplish this by examin-




s). Regional cost distribution G(s)
has the same “shape” as G, but a diﬀerent scale. We call s the scale parameter. Since we have nor-
malized the range of F to the unit interval, this sequence of models captures an increasing variation
of the regional cost distribution relative to that of the supplier production cost distribution.
Large regional costs drive preference away from pooling. Section 4.3.1 shows that with two
suppliers a buyer using mechanism RE always ﬁnds it optimal to pool. Following that intuition,
does the buyer always prefer to pool even with three or more suppliers? Here we show that
the answer is “no,” and in fact the buyer prefers not to pool when the regional cost variation
dominates suppliers’ production cost variation, i.e., when s is large. This can happen, for example,
in cases where suppliers use standard production technology and the variability of production
costs is negligible in comparison to that of regional costs — which could be driven by a variety of
sources ranging from incremental transportation rate changes to catastrophic port strikes. When
18the regional cost variation is relatively large, pooling and “losing big” (as described on page 8)
could be catastrophic for the buyer. (For example, if a strike hit the originating port in a region
containing all N of her suppliers.) Intuitively the buyer might want to diversify her supply base,
but then again we recall the N = 2 case for which we know that pooling is optimal due to supplier
windfall-proﬁt taking. How can the buyer beneﬁt from diversifying when using mechanism RE? The
key is that, with N ≥ 3 suppliers, the buyer can partially diversify by grouping suppliers together
into diﬀerent regions. This curbs unilateral regional cost advantages and forestalls windfall-proﬁt
taking. Suppliers in a low-cost region will — in the course of competing for the buyer’s business
in the auction — transfer the surplus of their regional cost advantage to the buyer. This result is
formalized in Proposition 4 below, which shows that, in fact, the buyer would always prefer to have
at least R = ⌊N
2 ⌋ regions (with at least two suppliers per region) to any less diversiﬁed strategy
with R < ⌊N
2 ⌋ regions. Therefore, we see that the number of suppliers can aﬀect the supply base
design strategy under mechanism RE, and the pooling strategy can be dominated by the partially
diversifying strategy.
Preference between full and partial diversiﬁcation driven by regional cost distribution’s
shape. We now turn to the main goal of this subsubsection, which is to show that a buyer using
mechanism RE with three or more suppliers need not ﬁnd fully diversifying optimal. In particular,
we show that the buyer prefers the partially diversifying strategy to the fully diversifying strategy
when the scale parameter s is large and G has a left (low-cost) “tail” (this will be made more precise
shortly). These conditions make windfall-proﬁt taking a serious concern for the buyer. When s is
big, regional costs largely determine the auction winner. Furthermore, when G has a left tail there
is more chance for low “outlier” regional costs. Hence, fully diversifying under these conditions is
apt to backﬁre by yielding a winning supplier with a sizeable, unilateral regional cost advantage
that he absorbs through windfall-proﬁt taking: Even though the buyer has suppliers in N regions,
she incurs costs as if she contracts with a supplier in the second-cheapest of N regions. On the
other hand, if the buyer chose to forestall windfall proﬁt-taking by partially diversifying, then she
would have two suppliers in each of ⌊N
2 ⌋ regions, and incur costs associated with the cheapest of
⌊N
2 ⌋ regions. After netting out the production costs (whose variation is small relative to regional
costs), the buyer’s preference between partial and full diversiﬁcation depends on the relative sizes
of Y 2:N and Y 1:⌊N
2 ⌋. The following proposition summarizes the results so far in this section.
Proposition 4 When the scale parameter s of the regional cost distribution is suﬃciently large:
19• The partially diversifying strategy that has ⌊N
2 ⌋ regions with at least two suppliers each dom-
inates any strategy with fewer regions;
• The buyer prefers the partially diversifying strategy to the fully diversifying strategy if Y 2:N >
Y 1:⌊N
2 ⌋; vice versa.
We now lend analytical support to our earlier statement that the buyer prefers partial diversi-
ﬁcation when G has a left “tail.” More precisely, we analytically show how a left tail causes Y 2:N
to exceed Y 1:⌊N
2 ⌋. Setting ¯ G(y)
def
= 1 − G(y) and letting ¯ G−1 denote the inverse function of ¯ G, one
can show (see the e-companion, §EC.6) that





















Note that for z ∈ (0,1), there exists a z ∈ (0,1) such that nzn−1 − (n − 1)zn − z⌊N
2 ⌋ is negative
to the left of z and positive to the right of z. Therefore, if G has a left tail such that most of its
density is piled close to the right end-point of the support, then g( ¯ G−1(z)) is large for z close to
zero but is small for z close to one, and thus Y 1:⌊N
2 ⌋ − Y 2:N must be negative, which implies that
partially diversifying is preferred. Likewise, if regional costs tend to be packed closely towards the
low-cost end, G’s density is piled near the left endpoint and the opposite argument implies that
pooling is preferred.
The above paragraph discussed how the shape of a general cost distribution G drives the buyer’s
preference between partial and full pooling. To illustrate this point in a more speciﬁc way, we
consider a parameterized power-function family of regional costs, G(s)(y) = (
y
s)v, where y ∈ [0,s].
This distribution’s density function takes various shapes according to the shape parameter v > 0:
As illustrated in Figure 3(a), the density distribution is very concentrated near the left endpoint
when v is small; in contrast, the density distribution ﬂattens out as v increases. Consistent to the
above discussion on the shape of distribution G, we ﬁnd that the buyer prefers fully diversifying
when v is small but prefers the partially diversifying strategy otherwise.
Corollary 1 Suppose G(s)(y) = (
y
s)v. When scale parameter s is suﬃciently large, there exists a
threshold v such that the buyer prefers fully diversifying if v < v, and partially diversifying if v > v.
In summary, we have shown that, even with more than two suppliers, a buyer using mechanism
RE will often not wish to fully diversify her supply base. This reenforces our main message that
bargaining power can have a profound impact on the buyer’s supply base design.
204.4 General takeaways
Sections 4.2–4.3 suggest that the buyer should carefully evaluate her bargaining clout before de-
ciding to diversify her supply base. Buyers with strong bargaining power always ﬁnd it optimal to
have just one supplier per region (fully diversifying); this is because diversifying mitigates the ex-
posure to regional cost shocks, while such buyers can use reserve prices and biasing rules to prevent
suppliers from absorbing the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation and hence capture signiﬁcant beneﬁts from
having a supplier in a low-cost region. In contrast, for buyers who have extremely little channel
power and cannot prevent advantaged suppliers from making signiﬁcant windfall proﬁts, there is
little beneﬁt to diversifying and they should only add more regions to their portfolio if doing so is
unlikely to forfeit the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation to an advantaged supplier. Because a supplier with
a sizeable regional cost advantage can largely absorb the resulting beneﬁts if he is the only supplier
in his region, the buyer can avoid the emergence of such an advantaged supplier by keeping two
suppliers in each region (partially diversifying). In particular, for a buyer who uses a two-supplier
supply base, there is little beneﬁt to diversifying and she should always instead simply pool her risk
by choosing both suppliers in a single region. While such a buyer is inevitably more vulnerable to
cost shocks, by pooling she ensures greater cost parity between suppliers, which she needs to drive
down suppliers’ price bids. A buyer with weak bargaining power who uses more than two suppliers
will diversify a two-supplier region into two single-supplier regions only if neither region is likely
to contain an advantaged supplier that can absorb the beneﬁts of the diversiﬁcation. Because the
beneﬁt of this diversiﬁcation accrues precisely when just one of the two regions experiences a large
regional cost, this pushes the buyer to prefer diversifying only if, in such a case, she has supplier(s)
in a third region which is unlikely to experience a large regional cost. Consequently, buyers with
weak bargaining power prefer to fully diversify only if there are at least three suppliers in the supply
base and the regional cost distribution does not have a left (low-cost) tail.
5. Extensions
5.1 Codependent regional costs
Our analyses in §4 assumed independent regional costs. However, one can easily imagine situations
where regions exhibit vulnerability to common shock factors, such as the price of oil or global
shipping volumes. This subsection examines the results of Propositions 2-4 for a setting with ex
ante symmetric and codependent regions. We ﬁrst discuss how the result extend, and then conclude
this subsection with a proposition formalizing this discussion.
21Regional codependence does not aﬀect buyer’s preference for diversifying with OPT.
Proposition 2 revealed that the buyer prefers to fully diversify no matter what the production cost
and regional cost distributions are. The intuition is that the buyer diversiﬁes in order to enjoy the
upside beneﬁt of ﬁnding suppliers with attractive regional costs. Surprisingly, this general result
extends even when the regional costs can be codependent (technically, this follows from the fact
that Lemma 1 holds even when regional costs are codependent). Thus, even if regions’ costs are
correlated, the buyer still places exactly one supplier in each region in order to diversify her regional
cost risk as much as possible.
Regional codependence aﬀects the buyer’s preference under RE only when she has
three or more suppliers. Because Lemma 1 remains valid in the presence of regional codepen-
dence, Proposition 3 extends to codependent regions and consequently a buyer using mechanism
RE always prefers to forestall windfall-proﬁt taking by pooling when she has just two suppliers.
Diversifying leaves the buyer with downside risk but no upside beneﬁt, and this remains true no
matter how small the windfall-proﬁt taking risk is: Regardless of how highly positively correlated
the regional costs are, the buyer’s preference for pooling is unchanged. On the other hand, when
the buyer has three or more suppliers and uses mechanism RE, regional codependence can af-
fect her supply base design preference. To see why, consider correlated, random regional costs
(y1,y2,...,yR) for which there exists a random state variable ξ having distribution P( ) such that
the yr’s are independently distributed according to some distribution function G( |ξ). (In the ter-
minology of Shaked (1977), these random variables are “positive dependent by mixture.”) Using
§4.3.2’s results for the case with identically and independently distributed regional costs (Propo-
sition 4), we can see that the eﬀect of regional codependence on the diversiﬁcation strategy thus
depends on both P( ) and the family of distributions G( |ξ). (Unless of course the family G( |ξ)
is such that Y 1:⌊N
2 ⌋ never exceeds Y 2:N [or vice-versa] — in such cases the codependence does
not aﬀect the buyer’s preference between fully and partially diversifying.) For example, consider
G(y|ξ) = s−ξyξ with a given s > 0. In such a case, a small value of state variable ξ can model
the case in which regional costs are mainly driven by global factors and exhibit small variance; in
contrast, a large ξ can model the case in which regional costs are mainly driven by local factors
and exhibit large variance. According to Corollary 1, it is clear that the buyer prefers partially
diversifying if the state variable distribution P(ξ) has enough of its density concentrated at large
values of ξ, but would instead prefer fully diversifying were the density concentrated primarily at
small values of ξ.
22The following proposition formalizes this subsection’s discussion.
Proposition 5 With codependent, ex ante symmetric regions,
• Under mechanism OPT, the buyer’s preference is robust to regional codependence and she
always ﬁnds it optimal to fully diversify her supply base.
• Under mechanism RE,
– with two suppliers the buyer’s preference is robust to regional codependence and she
always ﬁnds it optimal to pool her supply base;
– with three or more suppliers, regional codependence can aﬀect the buyer’s preference
between fully diversifying and partially diversifying.
5.2 Asymmetric regions
In this subsection, we extend our analysis of the supply base design decision and the eﬀect of
bargaining power to cases in which regions may be ex ante asymmetric. For example, this could
model settings where “oﬀshore” regions are characterized by low production costs and high regional
costs, while “onshore” regions have higher production costs but lower regional costs. To formalize
the existence of diﬀerent types of regions (such as onshore versus oﬀshore), we will introduce
k = 1,2,... as an index over region types. For a type-k region, let Fk denote the production cost
distribution and let Gk denote the regional cost distribution. Furthermore, we denote the total
cost distribution for a region-k supplier as Hk
def
= Fk ⊕ Gk, where the convolution operator ⊕ is
such that Hk(z) =
  ∞
−∞ Gk(z−x)dFk(x). Similarly, let ˆ Hk
def









fk(x). In words, ˆ Fk(z) and ˆ Hk(z) denote the
distributions of a region-k supplier’s virtual cost and adjusted virtual cost, respectively. We will
assume independence of production costs and regional costs. The optimal mechanism is as discussed
in §3.2, with ψ replaced by ψk for each type-k supplier i.
Weak buyer still prefers to pool. For simplicity we will focus our RE analysis on the two-
supplier case. With asymmetric regions, we can prove that Proposition 3 still holds. In other
words, a buyer using mechanism RE will never want to choose two suppliers each from diﬀerent,
asymmetric regions. For a buyer facing oﬀshore and onshore regions, the buyer should always choose
between onshore and oﬀshore, and never mix by choosing one supplier from each. An important
follow-up question is which region the buyer should locate her two suppliers in: Is it better to
23choose both suppliers onshore or oﬀshore? Intuitively, one might expect that the buyer needs to




k ⊕ Gk, the distribution of the highest total cost in region k. Because competitive pricing
in the auction will inﬂuence the buyer’s total costs, when all else is equal the buyer favors regions
with suppliers who tend to be evenly matched. Thus, the variability of production costs within the
region is important to the buyer, and she may even favor a region with a higher average production
costs if these costs are less variable. The following proposition formalizes this discussion.
Proposition 6 With two suppliers, it is always optimal to pool if mechanism RE is used, even
when regions are ex ante asymmetric. In particular, it is optimal to choose a type-k region such
that the expected highest total cost,
  ∞
−∞ zd ˜ Hk, is minimized.
Strong buyer prefers diversiﬁcation unless access to attractive regions is limited. Even
if the buyer has access to N regions, some regions may be so comparatively bad that she would
never choose to locate suppliers there.5 Thus, asymmetry may break the buyer’s preference for
diversiﬁcation, even if she has full bargaining power. However, this stems from limited availability
of regions. For the remainder of our discussion we focus on what happens in settings where the
buyer has access to up to N copies of each region type. In this case, we can prove that our earlier
insights remain valid: With full bargaining power it is optimal to fully diversify the supply base.
However, the way in which the buyer chooses to fully diversify the supply base may be more nuanced
than in the case with ex ante symmetric regions. In particular, even with N copies of each region
type available, the buyer might choose to use multiple types of regions when fully diversifying her
supply base. For example, consider a two-supplier case with two types of regions. Suppose that
ˆ H1 is the two-point distribution with probability mass q at zero and probability mass 1−q at one,
and that ˆ H2 is the uniform distribution U[0,1]. When q > 1
3, it is easy to conﬁrm the optimality
of the “mixed diversiﬁcation strategy” which puts one supplier in each type of region. Comparing
the region types, we see that type-1’s costs are bimodal and in this sense are “riskier” than type
2’s costs which are uniform. Choosing a supplier from a type-2 region helps the buyer decrease her
risk. However, with one supplier already positioned to manage risks, there is diminished need to
use the second in the same way. As a result, the buyer can be better oﬀ using one type-2 region as
a “safety” and then gambling on a “bet” by having one type-1 region.
5For example, suppose N = 2 and there are two regions with the same production cost distribution U[0,1] but
diﬀerent regional cost distributions G1 and G2. Suppose that Gk has probability mass pk at 1 and probability mass
1 − pk at 0. It is easy to check that it is optimal to select both suppliers from region 1 if and only if p2 >
p1
5−4p1 .
24Proposition 7 If mechanism OPT is used, it is always optimal to fully diversify even when regions
are ex ante asymmetric. However, the optimal diversiﬁcation strategy may involve diﬀerent region
types.
In summary, we again see that buyers with more bargaining power prefer more diversiﬁcation.
This is the key takeaway of this section. We also observed that the ability to mix-and-match ex ante
asymmetric regions naturally adds additional considerations about how best to tactically execute
a fully diversifying strategy. However, as this latter point is beyond the main “bargaining power”
message of this paper, we defer a fuller analysis of this point to future work.
5.3 Optimal supply base design for a buyer with moderate bargaining power
Mechanisms OPT and RE represent the full and zero bargaining power cases, respectively. Using
these two mechanisms, comparing the buyer’s diversiﬁcation preferences reveals that buyers with
more bargaining power favor more diversiﬁcation. In this subsection we examine whether this
insight extends to a third auction mechanism, the reverse English auction with a reserve price
(RER). Compared to the zero-bargaining power mechanism, RER adds the power to set a credible
reserve price. Thus, our goal in this section is to see whether adding the reserve price to the
reverse English auction format will encourage, or discourage, diversiﬁcation. To make our results
comparable with Propositions 2-4, and for simplicity, we will assume that suppliers’ production
costs and regional costs are all independent and that regions are ex ante symmetric.
In the remainder of this section we will show that greater bargaining power does indeed encour-
age the buyer to diversify more. We demonstrate this by ﬁnding the buyer’s supply base design
preference under RER and then comparing it to her preferences under RE. We ﬁrst show that, with
two suppliers, the buyer can ﬁnd it optimal to diversify if using mechanism RER, in contrast her
universal preference for pooling with mechanism RE. We then show that for three or more suppli-
ers, when the scale parameter of the regional cost distribution is large, the buyer always prefers to
fully diversify with mechanism RER, in contrast to her preference under RE which was to partially
diversify depending on the region cost distribution’s shape.
Diversiﬁcation can be optimal with two suppliers. With two suppliers, the sign of the
buyer’s diversiﬁcation tradeoﬀ (per Deﬁnition 1) under mechanism RER can be positive or negative,
depending on the realized values of the regional cost diﬀerence |y1 − y2| and the larger production
cost X2:2, as stated in the following lemma. This contrasts sharply with the always non-positive
diversiﬁcation tradeoﬀ under mechanism RE.
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Figure 2: Eﬀect of reserve price when N = 2. Panel (a) illustrates Lemma 2; panel (b) illustrates
how the reserve price aﬀects the diversiﬁcation tradeoﬀ.
Lemma 2 If |y1 − y2| ≥ 2(1 − X2:2), the buyer’s diversiﬁcation tradeoﬀ (per Deﬁnition 1) is non-
negative. If |y1 − y2| ≤ 1 − X2:2, or if |y1 − y2| ≤ 2(1 − X2:2) and X2:2 ≤ 1
2, the diversiﬁcation
tradeoﬀ is non-positive.
Figure 2(a) illustrates Lemma 2, and Figure 2(b) demonstrates the intuition behind it: When
the regional cost diﬀerence is large (e.g., |y1 − y2| ≥ 2 − 2X2:2), a reserve price eﬀectively limits
windfall proﬁt-taking and allows the buyer to capture signiﬁcant cost savings when sourcing from a
low-regional-cost supplier. Consequently, diversifying makes the buyer better oﬀ under mechanism
RER. As a direct comparison against mechanism RE, Figure 2(b) shows the diversiﬁcation upside
and downside under mechanism RER for the same setting as in Figure 1(b).
Example 3:
• When (y1,y2) = (yH,yL), had the buyer diversiﬁed, although the advantaged supplier 2 would
still win the auction (as in Figure 1(b)), the reserve price would cap its payment at 1, yielding
a total procurement cost 1 + yL to the buyer. Namely, the reserve price would increase the
diversiﬁcation upside to (x1 + yH) − (1 + yL), compared to zero in Figure 1(b).
• When (y1,y2) = (yL,yH), had the buyer diversiﬁed, although the advantaged supplier 1
would still win the auction (as in Figure 1(b)), the reserve price would again cap its payment
at 1, yielding a total procurement cost 1 + yL to the buyer. Namely, the reserve price would
decrease the diversiﬁcation downside to (1+yL)−(x1+yL), compared to (x2+yH)−(x1+yL)
in Figure 1(b).
26As a result of eﬀectively truncating large windfall proﬁt opportunities, when the regional cost
diﬀerence is large the buyer who can use a reserve price in a reverse English auction has a positive
diversiﬁcation tradeoﬀ. However, when the regional cost diﬀerence is small, the reserve price is
inactivated — in such cases the auction payment is (as in RE) set purely by pricing competition.
Thus, even with a reserve price, the buyer could have a negative diversiﬁcation tradeoﬀ.
In general, the preference for or against diversiﬁcation plays out according to the speciﬁc distri-
butions of F and G, in particular their probability masses over the regions depicted in Figure 2(a).
However, we can prove that under RER the buyer can indeed ﬁnd it optimal to diversify, as for-
malized at the end of this subsection.
With three or more suppliers, fully diversify with large regional costs. We now turn
to the case with three or more suppliers, and consider any family of regional cost distributions
G(s) as deﬁned in §4.3.2. Note that when the scale parameter s of the regional cost distribution is
large enough, mechanism RER is a good “facsimile” of mechanism OPT: In both cases the winner
is likely to be determined by regional costs, while the payment is likely to be determined by the
reserve price. Using this intuition, we can prove that when s is large it is optimal to fully diversify
under mechanism RER. This contrasts with the buyer’s preference under RE, which even with a
large s favored partially pooling depending on the shape of the regional cost distribution, G.
Proposition 8 Suppose the buyer uses mechanism RER.
• With two suppliers, the buyer ﬁnds it optimal to diversify if the expected regional cost diﬀerence
E[|y1 − y2|] is large enough.
• With more than two suppliers, for any family of regional cost distributions G(s) as deﬁned
in §4.3.2, the buyer ﬁnds it optimal to fully diversify when the scale of the regional cost
distribution s is suﬃciently large.
6. Numerical Illustrations
This section numerically illustrates our results. For concision we focus on Propositions 2-5. To
provide a common metric for comparing the relative performance of diﬀerent supply base design
strategies, we benchmark all supply base design strategies to the pooling strategy and deﬁne, for
any supply base design strategy “X”
rate of cost improvement = 1 −
expected total cost under strategy “X”
expected total cost under the pooling strategy
, (4)
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Figure 3: Panel (a) illustrates the power-function distribution’s density, g(y) = vs−vyv−1, for
scale parameter s = 4 and shape parameters v = 0.1, 1, 2. Panels (b)-(d) assume that suppliers’
production costs follow F ∼ U[0,1] and regional costs follow one of the power-function distributions
in Panel (a). For two suppliers, rates of cost improvement for diversifying under mechanisms OPT
and RE are plotted versus scale parameter s (Panel (b)) and regional cost correlation ρ (Panel (c)).
Panel (d) plots, for various scale parameters s, the cost improvement for the partial (R = 2) and
the full (R = 4) diversiﬁcation strategies when there are four suppliers.
28where “X” could be full diversiﬁcation, partial diversiﬁcation, etc. All our examples assume the
supplier production cost distribution F ∼ U[0,1]. For the regional cost distribution we use members
of the power-function family G(s)(y) = (
y
s)v, where v and s are the shape and scale parameters,
respectively, and the domain of G(s) is [0,s]. Figure 3(a) illustrates the density functions of these
distributions for a ﬁxed scale parameter s = 4 and three shape parameters v = 0.1,1,2.
Illustration of Propositions 2-3. Figure 3(b) plots the rates of cost improvement for the
diversifying strategy under mechanisms OPT and RE, for the two-supplier case. For all three
regional cost distributions (v = 0.1,1,2), the rate is positive under mechanism OPT and negative
under mechanism RE, conﬁrming that diversifying is optimal under OPT (Proposition 2) and
pooling is optimal under mechanism RE (Proposition 3). In all cases, the magnitude of the rate
of cost improvement increases as the scale of the regional cost distribution increases. In summary,
the buyer can be signiﬁcantly better oﬀ by optimizing her supply base design, especially when the
variation of regional costs is large relative to that of supplier production costs, i.e., when s is large.
Illustration of Proposition 5. Figure 3(c) illustrates the eﬀect of regional cost codependence by
studying a two-supplier case, in which two regions (regions 1 and 2) have correlated and identically




1 − λ2y2 and region 2 has a random cost yc
2 = λy2 +
√






2 ], where y1
and y2 are i.i.d. draws from one of the power-function distributions illustrated in Figure 3(a). Thus,
yc
1 and yc
2 are identically distributed and have correlation ρ = 2λ
√
1 − λ2 ∈ [−1,1]. Figure 3(c) plots
the rate of cost improvement from diversifying for various regional cost correlations ρ. Conﬁrming
Proposition 5, we see that diversifying is always optimal under mechanism OPT and pooling is
always optimal under mechanism RE, no matter how the regions’ costs are correlated. We also see
that the magnitude of the buyer’s beneﬁt from choosing the optimal strategy decreases with the
regional cost correlation. Intuitively, the buyer is indiﬀerent between pooling and diversifying when
the regional costs are perfectly positively correlated — in such a case, all regions are equivalent
from a cost perspective. Indeed, we see zero cost diﬀerence when ρ = 1. In contrast, we see that
choosing the optimal supply base design strategy is the most critical when the regional costs are
perfectly negatively correlated — the case in which regional cost disparity is most signiﬁcant. A
buyer who uses mechanism OPT can take advantage of such regional cost disparity and hence ﬁnds
it extremely beneﬁcial to diversify her supply base; in contrast, a buyer who uses mechanism RE
29expects severe windfall proﬁt-taking by advantaged suppliers and consequently ﬁnds it extremely
beneﬁcial to pool her two suppliers in the same region.
Illustration of Proposition 4. Figure 3(d) plots the rates of cost improvement for partially
diversifying (R = 2) and fully diversifying (R = 4) for a setting in which the buyer uses mechanism
RE and has four suppliers. Proposition 4 is veriﬁed: When the scale parameter s is large enough:
(I) the pooling strategy is dominated by the partially diversifying strategy; and (II) the buyer
prefers fully diversifying when the shape parameter is small, i.e., v = 0.1, but prefers the partially
diversifying strategy when the shape parameter is larger, i.e., v = 1,2. Moreover, the ﬁgure indicates
that the insights of Proposition 4 can hold even when the scale parameter s ≃ 1, i.e., when the
variation of the regional cost distribution is comparable to that of the supplier production cost
distribution. However, the plots also indicate that the performance diﬀerence between the partially
and fully diversifying strategies is reasonably small when the scale parameter s is small.
7. Conclusions
A buyers’ total procurement cost includes not only the contract payment to a supplier, but also
other costs such as transportation/logistics costs that depend on a supplier’s region and are subject
to regional cost shocks driven by labor strikes, regulation changes, political events, etc. To mitigate
regional cost risks, a buyer seeking to minimize her total procurement cost can strategically reduce
the cost correlation across suppliers by diversifying her supply base (i.e., choosing suppliers from
diﬀerent regions). However, in settings where the buyer’s payment to her supplier is determined
by a competitive bidding process (i.e., an auction), the buyer’s upside beneﬁt of diversiﬁcation —
having a signiﬁcantly cost-advantaged supplier — can be undermined by this supplier’s windfall
proﬁt-taking. This paper models the interaction between the buyer’s supply-base-design strategy
and the risks of windfall proﬁt-taking by suppliers, and characterizes the optimal supply-base-
design strategy under various auction mechanisms. To our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst study
of supply base design to mitigate regional cost shocks.
We ﬁnd that the buyer needs to make a tradeoﬀ between the beneﬁt from diversifying her risk
of exposure to cost shocks, and the risk that suppliers will absorb such beneﬁts for themselves by
taking windfall proﬁts. The ability of suppliers to take windfall proﬁts depends upon the buyer’s
bargaining power, that is, the buyer’s ability to choose an auction mechanism to suppress supplier
proﬁts. In particular, at one extreme, when the buyer has full bargaining power and thus can impose
the optimal mechanism (i.e., the optimal reserve price plus the optimal contract allocation rule
30that biases against cost-advantaged suppliers), windfall proﬁt-taking is curbed and consequently
the buyer ﬁnds it optimal to fully diversify her supply base (i.e., select each supplier from a diﬀerent
region). However, at the other extreme, when the buyer has no bargaining power and solely relies
on supplier competition for price concessions (i.e., uses a reverse English auction with no reserve
price), supplier windfall proﬁt-taking can be severe and consequently the buyer diversiﬁes less.
With two suppliers she always ﬁnds it optimal to pool both suppliers in a single region. With more
suppliers she prefers a blended strategy: She diversiﬁes by using multiple regions, but keeps two
suppliers per region to hedge her bets and eliminate the risk that any supplier possesses a unilateral
regional cost advantage. We also study cases where the buyer has intermediate bargaining power
and thus can impose a reserve price when using a reverse English auction. We ﬁnd that imposing
a reserve price allows the buyer to truncate large supplier proﬁts, so when the cost shock size is
likely to be large the buyer prefers fully diversifying when she can use a reserve price. Overall,
buyers with strong bargaining power prefer to diversify more, while buyers with less bargaining
power prefer to diversify less due to concerns about windfall proﬁt-taking.
We ﬁnd that introducing codependence across regional cost shocks generally leaves the buyer’s
supply base design decision unchanged, but can aﬀect the buyer’s decision when she has three
or more suppliers and is susceptible to severe windfall proﬁt-taking by advantaged suppliers (for-
mat RE). In these cases, codependence can encourage or discourage diversiﬁcation, depending on
whether or not it reduces the risk of an advantaged supplier emerging — that is, reduces the risk of
windfall proﬁt-taking. We also examine ex ante asymmetry across regions. Although asymmetry
complicates the tactics of supply base design, it generally leaves the main strategic ﬁnding intact
— namely, buyers with more bargaining power prefer to diversify more.
Our study was motivated by focusing on shocks to the buyer’s “non-price” costs (transportation
costs, logistics costs, etc.), but our results can easily be extended to cases where suppliers share
regional cost drivers, such as costs associated with a small local labor force, regional energy market,
or a common second-tier supply base. More precisely, all analyses in this paper follow if regional
cost yr is re-interpreted as a commonly known cost factor shared by all suppliers within region r.
Although we assume that the distributions capturing production costs and regional costs remain
static over time, Propositions 2-3 (and their extensions Propositions 5-6) directly extend to cases
where these distributions vary over time, given that these results hold regardless of production cost
distribution F or regional cost distribution G. For Proposition 4, which says the optimal strategy
depends on the shape of the regional cost distribution G, we suspect that the optimal supply-base
31design decision depends on the shape of the regional cost distribution G “on average,” if G is
time-variant.
We examined three auction mechanisms that are theoretically and practically important. Of
course, buyers may also use other auction mechanisms or unstructured bargaining processes —
for example, the buyer may negotiate with the advantaged supplier. For such cases, we suspect
that the key insight of our paper will continue to apply: The more bargaining clout the buyer has
to control windfall-proﬁt taking by cost-advantaged suppliers, the more she will prefer building a
diversiﬁed supply base. Our results can also extend to the cases where the buyer has only a limited
number of regions to choose from; suppose there are only R < N regions available — then the
buyer tends to use all R regions if fully diversifying is optimal in the unconstrained case, or tends
to use min{R,⌊N
2 ⌋} regions if the partially diversifying strategy is optimal in the unconstrained
case. Some other extensions are possible and would also have straightforward implications, for
example, imposing a ﬁxed cost of using additional regions.
Finally, to keep our analysis focused and tractable we ignore the buyer’s inventory decisions.
To the extent that the buyer can anticipate regional cost shocks, she may choose to speculatively
purchase inventory to avoid future cost spikes, e.g., impending logistic cost increases in a certain
country. Interestingly, our analysis suggests that the usefulness of such a strategy depends on the
buyer’s bargaining clout. Speculative inventory might behoove a buyer with little bargaining clout,
who might use it to help avoid paying windfall proﬁts to cost advantaged suppliers. On the other
hand, speculative inventory would likely be of much less beneﬁt to a buyer with strong bargaining
clout, who could contract with cost-advantaged suppliers without paying an undue price premium,
thereby reducing the speculative beneﬁts of holding inventory. We leave a detailed analysis of the
interplay between inventory decisions, bargaining power and supply base design to our future work.
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EC.1. Proof of Proposition 1
If a supplier drops out of the auction when the calling price is higher than his true adjusted virtual
cost and there is at least one other supplier staying in the auction, the supplier loses the auction
and gets zero proﬁt. In contrast, a supplier can possibly win the auction and get a positive proﬁt by
staying in the auction until the calling price reaches his true adjusted virtual cost. Thus, dropping
out of the auction before the calling price reaches his true adjusted virtual cost is a dominated
strategy for the supplier.
If a supplier stays in the auction when the calling price falls below his true adjusted virtual
cost, it is possible that he wins the auction. However, in such a case his payment will be below
his production cost and he will earn negative proﬁt. Thus, staying in the auction when the calling
price falls below the true adjusted virtual cost is a dominated strategy for the supplier.
Therefore, it is a dominant strategy for each supplier to stay in the auction until the calling
price reaches his true adjusted virtual cost. Consequently, the optimal mechanism is implemented:
The supplier with the lowest adjusted virtual cost will win the auction and will be paid exactly as
the optimal mechanism’s payment rule speciﬁes.
EC.2. Proof of Lemma 1
The expected diﬀerence between the total procurement cost under the R-region strategy and that






πMech(x,ahh) − πMech(x,ahl) + πMech(x,all) − πMech(x,alh)
 
. (EC.1)
Note that ahh = ahl ∨ alh and all = ahl ∧ alh. Therefore, the lemma follows from the deﬁnitions
of supermodular and submodular functions.
ec1EC.3. Proof of Proposition 2
The fact that πOPT(x,a) = min
i=1,...,N
{ψ(xi) + ai} implies that, for any ˆ a and ˜ a, we have that
πOPT(x,ˆ a∧˜ a) = πOPT(x,ˆ a)∧πOPT(x,˜ a) and πOPT(x,ˆ a∨˜ a) ≥ πOPT(x,ˆ a)∨πOPT(x,˜ a). Thus,
πOPT(x,a) is supermodular in a for any x. Therefore, the proposition follows from Lemma 1.
EC.4. Proof of Proposition 3
When N = 2, we have πRE(x,a) = max{x1 + a1, x2 + a2}. It implies that, for any ˆ a and ˜ a, we
have πRE(x,ˆ a ∨ ˜ a) = πRE(x,ˆ a) ∨ πRE(x,˜ a) and πRE(x,ˆ a ∧ ˜ a) ≤ πRE(x,ˆ a) ∧ πRE(x,˜ a). Thus,
πRE(x,a) is submodular in a for any x. Therefore, the proposition follows from Lemma 1.
EC.5. Proof of Proposition 4
It is equivalent to prove the proposition by considering a family of models {(F(s),G),s ∈ R+}, where
F(s)(x)
def
= F(sx). As s goes to inﬁnity, the probability mass of F(s) collects near zero (i.e., for any
small ǫ > 0, s > ǫ−1 implies F(s)(ǫ) = 1). Therefore, as s goes to inﬁnity, production costs become
negligible and the buyer’s expected total procurement cost approaches Ey[second min
i=1,...,N
{ai}]. We ﬁrst
characterize the buyer’s preference for this limiting case. In this limiting case, the buyer’s expected
total procurement cost equals Y 1:R if she uses R ≤ ⌊N
2 ⌋ regions with at least two suppliers in each.
The partially diversifying strategy that has ⌊N
2 ⌋ regions with at least two suppliers each dominates
any strategy with fewer regions, since Y 1:R decreases in R. Because the buyer’s expected total
procurement cost equals Y 2:N if she fully diversiﬁes, she prefers the partially diversifying strategy
to the fully diversifying strategy if Y 2:N > Y 1:⌊N
2 ⌋; in the reverse case, full diversiﬁcation is preferred.
Because the expected total-cost function is continuous in s, the preference characterization for this
limiting case also holds when s is suﬃciently large.
EC.6. Proof of Equation (3)





2 ⌋(y)dy because the tail probability Pr(Y1:R > z) = Pr(yr > z,r =




N ¯ GN−1(y) − (N − 1) ¯ GN(y)
 
dy because the tail prob-
ability Pr(Y2:R > z) = Pr(yr > z, for all r ∈ {1,...,R}) + Pr(yˆ r ≤ z for an ˆ r ∈ {1,...,R},yr >
z, for all r ∈ {1,...,R} \ {ˆ r}) = ¯ GR(z) + RG(z) ¯ GR−1(z) = R ¯ GR−1(z) − (R − 1) ¯ GR(z).
ec2EC.7. Proof of Corollary 1
When the regional costs are independent draws from a power-function distribution G(s)(y) = s−vyv










(N + 1/v)(N − 1 + 1/v)   (N/2 + 1 + 1/v)
(1 + 1/v)N(N − 1)   (N/2 + 1)
.
We now show that there exists a threshold v > 0 such that the above fraction is greater than 1 when
v < v and less than 1 when v > v. To see this, note that the numerator minus the denominator





> 0. Thus, the threshold v is the
unique positive root of b1 = b2v−1+...+b N
2
v− N




is strictly decreasing, approaches positive inﬁnity as v approaches zero, and approaches zero as v
approaches positive inﬁnity. For N ≥ 3 odd, we can similarly prove that Y 1: N−1
2
/Y 2:N is greater
(less) than 1 if v is greater (less) than a threshold v > 0. Thus the result holds.
EC.8. Proof of Proposition 5
In the presence of regional codependence, Propositions 2-3 still hold because the proof of Lemma 1
does not assume that regions are independent. To see this, note that the sign of equation (EC.1) is
not aﬀected by the distribution of y if πMech(x,a) is supermodular or submodular in a for all x.
EC.9. Proof of Proposition 6
Note that the buyer’s total procurement cost equals max{x1 + a1,x2 + a2} under mechanism RE.
Thus, if the buyer has one supplier in region 1 and one supplier in region 2, the expected total
cost equals
 
zdH1(z)H2(z); if the buyer uses two copies of region k, k = 1,2, the expected total
cost equals
 
zdHk(z)Hk(z). The diversiﬁcation strategy that has one supplier in region 1 and one
supplier in region 2 is dominated by either or both of the diversiﬁcation strategies that use two














zd[H1(z) − H2(z)]2 =
  ∞
−∞
[H1(z) − H2(z)]2dz > 0,
where the last equality uses integration by parts and the fact that H1(−∞) = H2(−∞) = 0 and
H1(∞) = H2(∞) = 1. The proposition follows because the buyer prefers pooling to diversifying
with two symmetric regions (per Proposition 3).
ec3EC.10. Proof of Proposition 7
When the buyer uses mechanism OPT, it is optimal to select all suppliers from diﬀerent regions
even when regions are asymmetric, because any R-region strategy having nr ≥ 2 suppliers in some
region r is dominated by the (R + 1)-region strategy having nr − 1 suppliers in region r and one
supplier in an (R + 1)st region which is of the same type as region r. This is true because the
proof of Lemma 1 is still valid given that the distributions of x and y are the same under both the
R-region strategy and the (R + 1)-region strategy.
EC.11. Proof of Lemma 2
With N = 2 suppliers, the buyer’s total cost under RER equals
πRER(x,a) = [(x1 + a1) ∨ (x2 + a2)] ∧ (1 + a1) ∧ (1 + a2).
Thus, πRER(x,ahh) = x1 ∨ x2 + y1 ∨ y2,
πRER(x,all) = x1 ∨ x2 + y1 ∧ y2,
πRER(x,ahl) = 1 ∧ [(x1 + |y1 − y2|) ∨ x2] + y1 ∧ y2,
πRER(x,alh) = 1 ∧ [(x2 + |y1 − y2|) ∨ x1] + y1 ∧ y2.
Hence, πRER(x,ahh) − πRER(x,ahl) + πRER(x,all) − πRER(x,alh)
= 2(x1 ∨ x2) + |y1 − y2| − {1 ∧ [(x1 + |y1 − y2|) ∨ x2]} − {1 ∧ [(x2 + |y1 − y2|) ∨ x1]}. (EC.2)
Assuming without loss of generality that x1 ≥ x2, equation (EC.2) equals
• 0   I(|y1 − y2| ∈ [0,x1 − x2]) + (x1 − x2 − |y1 − y2|)   I(|y1 − y2| ∈ (x1 − x2,1 − x1]) +
(2x1 −x2 −1) I(|y1 −y2| ∈ (1−x1,1−x2])+(2x1 +|y1 −y2|−2) I(|y1 −y2| ∈ (1−x2,∞)),
if 2x1 − x2 − 1 ≤ 0;
• 0   I(|y1 − y2| ∈ [0,1 − x1]) + (x1 + |y1 − y2| − 1)   I(|y1 − y2| ∈ (1 − x1,x1 − x2]) + (2x1 −
x2 − 1)   I(|y1 − y2| ∈ (x1 − x2,1 − x2]) + (2x1 + |y1 − y2| − 2)   I(|y1 − y2| ∈ (1 − x2,∞)), if
2x1 − x2 − 1 > 0.
This implies that equation (EC.2) is non-positive if |y1−y2| < (1−x1), is non-negative if |y1−y2| ≥
2(1 − x1), and is non-positive if 2x1 − x2 − 1 ≤ 0 (this latter condition is always satisﬁed when
x1 ≤ 1
2) and |y1 − y2| < 2(1 − x1). The lemma thus follows.
ec4EC.12. Proof of Proposition 8
Two-supplier case. Assuming without loss of generality that x1 ≥ x2, equation (EC.2) is greater
than (2x1 − x2 − 1)   I(|y1 − y2| ≤ 2 − 2x1) + [|y1 − y2| − (2 − 2x1)]   I(|y1 − y2| > 2 − 2x1) when
2x1 − x2 − 1 < 0, and it is greater than [|y1 − y2| − (2 − 2x1)]   I(|y1 − y2| > 2 − 2x1) when
2x1 − x2 − 1 ≥ 0. Thus, the expectation of equation (EC.2) over the distribution of |y1 − y2| is
greater than min{2x1 − x2 − 1,0}Pr(|y1 − y2| ≤ 2 − 2x1) + E[|y1 − y2| − (2 − 2x1)||y1 − y2| >
(2−2x1)]Pr(|y1−y2| > 2−2x1), which is greater than E[|y1−y2|]−1−(2−2x1) ≥ E[|y1−y2|]−3.
This implies that it is optimal to diversify if E[|y1 − y2|] ≥ 3.
N ≥ 3 supplier case. As in Proposition 4’s proof, it is equivalent to consider a family of models
{(F(s),G),s ∈ R+}, where F(s)(x)
def
= F(sx). In such a case, the buyer using RER has an expected
total procurement cost Ex,y[second min
i=1,...,N
{xi
s + ai, 1
s + ai}], which approaches Ey[ min
i=1,...,N
{ai}] as s
approaches inﬁnity. In this limiting case the buyer’s expected total procurement cost is minimized
by the fully diversifying strategy, because (as is easy to show) min
i=1,...,N
{ai} is supermodular in a.
Because the expected total-cost function is continuous in s, the preference characterization for this
limiting case also holds when s is suﬃciently large.
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